Detection Categories
SaferSkills organizes its detection rules into five categories named for the artifact kind they target: MCP, SKILL, RULES, HOOKS, and PLUGIN. Within those categories, rules group into families by what they look for — prompt injection, obfuscation, dangerous shell, supply chain, transparency, maintenance, and community. Every rule carries a stable SS-<CATEGORY>-<NAME>-NN ID, a severity, and the sub-score it contributes to.
What are the five detection categories?
Section titled “What are the five detection categories?”The category is the closed set of artifact kinds a rule can target — MCP, SKILL, RULES, HOOKS, PLUGIN — and it forms the middle segment of every rule ID. A rule’s category determines which capabilities it is matched against during a scan; a HOOKS rule only fires on a discovered hook, an MCP rule only on a discovered MCP server, and so on. Some rules apply across every kind (for example, a missing-LICENSE check applies to all of them), but each is filed under one category for its rule ID.
These categories are about where a rule fires. The seven rule families below cut across the categories and describe what a rule looks for. A single category like MCP contains rules from several families — injection, supply chain, community — and a single family like prompt injection appears in multiple categories.
How are the rule families organized?
Section titled “How are the rule families organized?”The families map onto the five sub-scores. Injection, obfuscation, dangerous-shell, and supply-chain-integrity rules feed the Security or Supply Chain axes; transparency, maintenance, and community rules feed their namesake axes. Each rule names its sub-score in frontmatter, so a finding’s category badge and its score contribution are always consistent. See the five sub-scores for how those axes are weighted.
Prompt injection
Section titled “Prompt injection”Prompt-injection rules catch instructions hidden in content the agent reads as trusted — a skill body, an MCP tool description, a rules file. Real examples:
SS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01(high) — a fenced code block carrying an imperative that tells the agent to run a command.SS-MCP-POISON-UNICODE-TAG-01(critical) — invisible plane-14 Unicode tag characters smuggled into a tool description, visible to the model and invisible to a human reviewer.SS-RULES-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01(medium) — a rules file that commands the agent to hide or withhold information across every session.
This family is weighted heavily because indirect prompt injection is the #1 LLM risk in OWASP’s 2025 ranking (LLM01:2025) — and a skill body or tool description is exactly the untrusted external content it arrives in.
Obfuscation
Section titled “Obfuscation”Obfuscation rules catch content engineered to hide its real behavior from a reviewer. SS-HOOKS-OBFUSCATION-B64-SHELL-01 (high) fires when a hook Base64-decodes a blob and pipes it into a shell — there is no legitimate reason for a hook to obscure its own plain text. Related rules in this family catch homoglyph substitution, zero-width characters, and bidirectional-override tricks.
Dangerous shell and remote code execution
Section titled “Dangerous shell and remote code execution”These rules catch commands that execute attacker-controllable code, especially in hooks that run automatically on an agent event with no human in the loop. SS-HOOKS-RCE-CURL-PIPE-01 (critical) fires when a hook pipes a remote script straight into a shell — if the URL is ever compromised, attacker code runs on your machine. The family also covers unattended sudo, wide chmod, and rm -rf patterns.
MCP tool poisoning is a documented variant of this threat: Invariant Labs’ Tool Poisoning Attack (2025) demonstrated a poisoned MCP tool description that exfiltrated a user’s ~/.cursor/mcp.json and SSH keys, and OWASP lists MCP03:2025 Tool Poisoning in its MCP Top 10.
Supply chain
Section titled “Supply chain”Supply-chain rules catch threats to provenance and integrity. SS-MCP-SUPPLY-CHAIN-TYPOSQUAT-01 (high) flags a name one character off an established server; SS-MCP-SUPPLY-CHAIN-HASH-DRIFT-01 (high) flags content that changed since the last scan with no CHANGELOG — the rug-pull signature; SS-MCP-SUPPLY-CHAIN-UNSIGNED-01 (medium) flags a release with no signature to verify the bytes. The scale behind these rules is large: Sonatype’s 2024 supply-chain report found a 156% year-over-year rise in malicious open-source packages.
Transparency
Section titled “Transparency”Transparency rules are file-presence checks for the documents that let you verify what an artifact is and on what terms. SS-SKILL-TRANSPARENCY-LICENSE-01 (medium) fires when no LICENSE file is found; companion rules check for a README, CHANGELOG, SECURITY.md, and a manifest. These are deterministic and unambiguous — a file is present or it is not.
Maintenance
Section titled “Maintenance”Maintenance rules use repository-history signals to judge whether a project is actively cared for. SS-SKILL-MAINTENANCE-COMMIT-RECENCY-01 (medium) fires when the default branch has had no commit in over 365 days; companion rules check commit frequency, issue-response time, and CI health. Stale code accumulates unpatched vulnerabilities, so these are durability signals rather than security verdicts.
Community
Section titled “Community”Community rules surface external adoption context — and most are advisory. SS-SKILL-COMMUNITY-STARS-01 is info-tier (weight 0): it shows “fewer than 10 stars” as context but never moves the score, because stars are an easily-manipulated proxy for adoption. Cross-registry presence and contributor-count rules round out the family.
Where can I see every rule?
Section titled “Where can I see every rule?”The categories and families above are a map, not the territory. The complete, searchable list — every rule’s severity, sub-score, status, framework badges, trigger logic, and limitations, rendered live at the current rubric_version — lives on the methodology page on the main site, which also exports the visible rules to CSV. To understand how each finding is constructed and traced once a rule fires, read finding evidence.
Author: SaferSkills Team — methodology maintainers.